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Apology as Historical Dialogue

History plays a greater role in contemporary politics and conflicts than politicians and policy experts acknowledge. This volume accompanying the exhibit on political apologies appears at an opportune moment, in between the most tumultuous public awakening and demonstrations in Turkey in the summer of 2013 and the impending centenary of the destruction of the Armenians in Anatolia in April 2015. Turkey is going through democratic convulsions, presenting both the attraction of people's power and activism, as well as the risk of a charismatic leader overplaying his hand and leading the country to a precipice of reversing to authoritarianism. Much of this struggle takes place in and around historical identity. Not only has the struggle over the representations of the Armenian genocide have been integral part in the campaign by civil society to expand freedom of speech in the country, but also the peace process and negotiations with the Kurdish population is closely intertwined with references to historical violence and memory. The discussion of the atrocities inflicted mostly by the state upon the Kurds, but also by the Kurds has expanded recently to include the memory of the role of Kurds in the Armenian genocide. Memories of victimization drive politics, and occasionally are addressed by the stakeholders, including the willingness of certain Kurdish politicians to apologize for the role of Kurds in the genocide. When PM Erdoğan apologized for Dersim the debate ensued on what the political goals of the apology were, but not whether it was important or political. It was clearly both. A different mass apology of a kind took place in Hrant Dink's funeral, when liberal Turkey came out in force to apologize for not being able to stop the impending murder, and indirectly for not doing enough to integrate the memory of the Armenian destruction into the struggle for democracy.

The volume of essays address a variety of ways in which apologies have and could strengthen the political public culture in Turkey, from several disciplinary and theoretical perspectives. Often times the debate surrounding political apologies revolve around the question of whether the particular apology is "real", meaningful, or only words. As the essays make perfectly clear, apologies come in different shapes and carry varied political significance dependent on the circumstances. There is no one ideal type of a political apology. Some apologies are official, others are informal, accompanied by material reparation, restitution, or compensation; most are declarations, a speech and a political performance.

Historical legacy is critical for conflict resolution both domestically and internationally, in particular when the protagonists are defined by their identities. Victimization and atrocities are often not forgotten and continue to fester till they are addressed. While it is clear that we cannot change the past it is just as obvious that we do represent it in different narratives and consequently think about it in radically polarized ways. If history could only be remembered in a singular manner, and enmities continued to fester, surely no conflict would ever be resolved. For the opposite, one need look no further than Germany and France to recognize how far countries and peoples can overcome old animosities. But to do that, they need to work at conciliation.

Apology works wonders in personal relations, and it is increasingly utilized as a political tool towards bridging over group animosities; more specifically to begin or enhance a dialogue. Apologies are both ethical and political, and while some might emphasize the cynical and manipulating interpretation, we have to remember that even manipulation only works when it serves the goal of the parties involved, even if meant insincerely. The choices of offering apologies, accepting, rejecting, criticizing it, are all politically informed, and such have to be incorporated more centrally into the political discourse. Methodologically that means to incorporate history as a tool so that it can critically challenge the nationalist narrative and reform it, so that it is no longer the nation's only legitimate narrative and available identity.

Apology as Political Dialogue

In March 2013, at the end of US President Barack Obama's state visit to Israel and Palestine, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan to express "Israel's apology to the Turkish people for any mistakes that might have led to the loss of life or injury" aboard the ship Mavi Marmara raided by Israeli navy in May 2010 on its way to Gaza. During the raid nine passengers were killed. For more than two years Turkey demanded an apology as precondition, and when it arrived it looked like a victory for Turkey, and a testimony to the US influence on Israel and its ability to bring its two major allies in the region to talk with each other, again. Speculations abound about the medium and long range impact, the possible defeat for Hamas, and the potential resuscitation of the old friendship. The apology itself was constrained, the text having been agreed upon, allowed Israel to apologize for mistakes not for the action.

The short term media euphoria evaporated quickly. Both leaders play to multiple audiences and the material interests of the countries may not always overlap with the nationalist rhetoric. The initial bounce in Erdoğan's popularity was quickly reversed by the summer as he became politically embroiled domestically. Most Turks, according to polls, thought the apology was insufficient, while most Israelis, according to polls, were "critical" of the apology. This was in line with general attitudes towards government policies in both countries on other issues too. So no great surprise there. There were also the nationalist reactions, such as an extremist Israeli politician demanding Turkey to reciprocate and apologize for a WWII sinking of the Struma (1942). Then there was the question of domestic politics; Turkish opposition claiming government duplicity, while the government taking the high road, demanding that the apology would be seen "above politics" (Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu). By August, when PM Erdoğan claimed that Israel was behind the military coup in Egypt, the apology was a faint memory.

More interesting perhaps was the medium term impact it had on international politics. The apology achieved its purpose in that Turkey and Israel begun cooperating again, from tourism to natural gas exploration. While the atmosphere in Turkey remains very critical of Israel, the shift in policies was palpable. There is no doubt that Israel's apology was an important achievement for Turkish diplomacy. It would have had a longer impact and further strengthened Turkey's position in the region had the domestic volatility and the Syrian civil war not diminished its import. Because it was primarily a politically negotiated apology, not contrition,

similar to many other political events, its impact diminished in time, and the great enthusiasm disappeared within three months.

Politics as Historical Dialogue in North East Asia

Within days of the December 16, 2012 Japanese election, the new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe declared his intention to replace the 1995 apology for the wrongs caused by Japan during World War II with a more general "forward-looking statement" that is appropriate for the 21st century. Abe objected to the apology that had been issued by the more liberal Prime Minister Tomic Murayama, who had attempted to placate Japans' neighbors, specifically China and Korea. High on the list of contentious issues were sex slaves, known as comfort women, and biological experimentation, but the disputes over the extensive Japanese atrocities and crimes, as well as their acknowledgement, were wide-ranging. Most noteworthy, perhaps, is that Murayama's apology had been delivered in such a moderate manner that it was viewed as conveying regret rather than apology and had repeatedly and consistently been rejected by the intended recipients as a "non-apology." Abe, a long time denier of Japanese responsibility in any crimes of atrocity, was particularly vocal during the last 20 years in rejecting any references to the "Comfort Women."**1** Yet in his first year in power, Abe focused on the economy, and instigated little historical controversies. In August, Abe's anticipated visit to Yasukuni, the shrine for the war dead that includes Japans' war criminals and is subject to continuous controversies, did not take place in order to "open the door to a summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping and mend badly frayed ties." Instead three ministers and other parliamentarians took the pilgrimage and Abe himself sent an offering. All sides saw it as a compromise between domestic and international constrains, and it did not instigate a diplomatic crisis. It did not reverse Abe's nationalism, and on the spectrum of apologies, this is clearly an implicit act at best, but nonetheless it eased relations and signaled an effort to overcome the historical animosity even by nationalists like Abe. The role of history and the struggle over apologies between Japan, Korea, and China are well documented. This contemporary iteration, grounded in conflicting versions of history, carries very dangerous political consequences. It is both an international dispute and, like other historical disputes, is also a domestic dispute between Japanese liberals and nationalists.

The question is not only whose version of history is right, but also why do the parties care so much about an apology: Why do the Korean and the Chinese demand an apology that would be conveyed in a very specific manner, and why do the Japanese consistently refuse this formulation? Both sides agree about the centrality of the apology, either through desire or refusal. The mainstream domestic perception in Japan is that it had apologized plenty and need not further apologize.**2** In Korea the view is diametrically opposite: Japan has neither fully apologized nor recognized its own crimes and atrocities. This is clearly a political and diplomatic question, not a philological dispute. The rhetorical dispute is sometimes presented as being about the specific term used and whether the word should be translated as "apology" or "regret." The substantive dispute, in contrast, is whether to bridge historical differences through accommodation or to use history to assert nationalist pride. There is no parity between perpetrators and victims, and there is no doubt that the Japanese engaged in horrific crimes and oppression during the war and more broadly during their colonial rule. The conflict over apology is how to negotiate these memories in the contemporary world. Why do both sides find it

preferable to maintain their antagonistic position and not reach a solution? This dilemma concerns both sides, because for decades after World War II (largely up to the 1980s and 1990s) history was not a bone of contention in regional politics, but since then it has been at the heart of both tensions and attempts to reconcile, with the years 2001-2007 as the most tense period so far.**3** Yet the larger question may be whether the conflict over history and apologies is a question of realpolitik or a question of morality and the aspirations of idealists? Does the idealist/realist divide remain useful in our study of these questions or should realists begin to recognize the enormous role morality has on international politics?

History, Democratization, and Contrition

Since the end of the Cold War an international and public norm has evolved that demands that countries accept responsibility for their historical crimes and injustices. The growing impact of human rights in politics has introduced new considerations into old realpolitik: being ethical and subscribing to human rights norms has become a political asset and a factor in political persuasion. This trend was driven by both moral considerations and political calculations. The relative contributions of morality and political calculations is impossible to assess with precision, but it is clear that during the 1990s more than at any other period, ethical and realpolitik considerations reinforced each other. The foremost precedent was West Germany's embrace of its responsibility for the Holocaust, which began with paying reparations since the 1950s and became a fully national phenomenon in earnest in the 1970s. Another class of acknowledgement included a growing recognition of violence against indigenous peoples, primarily in the former British colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and even the United States. In 1988, the United States apologized to Japanese Americans for the internment during World War II and paid compensation. These domestic cases of apologies, which were part of a redress of historical injustices, did not lead to conflict resolution in a strict sense, but they did strengthen the norm of apology and the claim that ethics has a role to play in politics. None of these cases resulted from international pressure and were all embraced as a result of civic activism and domestic political pressure.

Over time, the proliferation of apologies has grown to such an extent that it has been celebrated by some as an international norm and derided by others as trite. Individual politicians diminish its significance further by continuously apologizing for numerous misdeeds and transgression as a matter of course. It is also true, that violence and atrocities have not diminished, and the rhetorical international commitment of the Responsibility to Protect is too often vacuous. Despite this, an official apology by a representative of the state for wrongdoings of the state has not lost its potency. These apologies are powerful and often create good will in intra- and international conflicts. I am not aware of any comprehensive list of political apologies, and they clearly differ in significance. In certain cases an apology assumes almost mythological dimensions, as for instance in Australia, when the Howard government which came into power in 1996 rejected the demands for an apology to the Aboriginal peoples and persisted until it left office eleven years later. The Labor government, which had planned to issue an apology in the 1990s, did so in 2008. During the decade when Howard was in power, in addition to being the subject of intense civic activism, apology became a constitutive element of the rivalry between the two political cultures in Australia and symbolized how each viewed the nation. The debate over apology

spoke both to the historical injustices as well as continuing discrimination against aboriginal people. This is a common theme in the debates over apologies in circumstances where the historical abuse is ongoing, or the legacy of the crimes has continuous ongoing significance for the contemporary descendants. A similar historical cum contemporary apology took place in the United Kingdom, where Prime Minister Tony Blair in the 1990s apologized to the Irish both for the violence during "the Troubles" (the three decades of violence beginning in the late 1960s), as well as for the famine in the 1840s. Both apologies were meant as good will gestures that eventually contributed to the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement. Such political apologies are strategic, and are best understood as both realpolitik and ethical; they employ moral rhetoric and ethical norms and are critical to the political process.

The content and the formulation of the apology are of almost secondary importance. It is the intent and the performance that really matter. Although the Japanese experience suggested that rhetorical gymnastics cannot camouflage a government's resistance to a sincere apology, the German apology to the Jews suggests precisely the opposite. The first post-War apology was made by Chancellor Adenauer when he presented the agreement for reparation to the West German Parliament, and he apologized for crimes committed "in the name" of the German people. Not for crimes committed "by Germany" or "by the German people," but in their name. This more distant formulation removed direct responsibility. Yet the linguistic formulation did not cause a backlash, perhaps because the norm of apologies had not yet evolved and perhaps because it was so unprecedented. The apology permitted Germany to begin its march on the long road of rebuilding its relationship with the Jewish people, with Israel, and most importantly, reimagining its own identity. Two decades later, when Willy Brandt kneeled in Warsaw to commemorate the victims of the Ghetto, he dramatically announced and established Germany's new self-identity. He transformed a formal political commitment to penance into a public commitment, launched his political opening to the East, and turned moral politics into a potent realpolitik. Germany had to go through further major transformations in the following generation, yet the direction was publically announced.**4** It was the German example that became a refrain in North East Asia, where critics often ask why Japan cannot be more like Germany.

A critical component of the German evolution towards political apology is the attitude regarding German suffering and victimization. In the early years, especially in the late 1940s and 1950s, the real economic hardship suffered by Germans meant that Adenauer was well ahead of the public in representing contrition. While almost no Germans today would compare the war and post-War German suffering to the suffering of Jews and others in the Holocaust, this was not the case in the early days after the War. Although German suffering was at the center of German experience, as the contrition culture evolved there became a provisional "strategic forgetting" of the German suffering. Indeed, the willingness to recognize responsibility and guilt without privileging one's own suffering is at the heart of what I described as "the guilt of nations" – a new international morality and a new set of political norms.**5**

A related strand evolved among countries that underwent the "third wave" of democratizations, first in a very limited manner in Greece, Spain, and Portugal, and later more boldly since the 1980s in Latin America. An embryonic process of what later became known as transitional justice began to take shape. Common to all of these was the acknowledgement by state institutions of the responsibility of state agents for perpetrating crimes and of the duty of the state to redress these crimes through one of several mechanisms, including trials, truth

commissions, commemorations, and reparations, which together reconstructed the national collective memory and identity. Coming to terms with the past became essential to the process of democratization. This new norm was most honored in its breach, but nonetheless it came to be expected and demanded in each new transition. More politicians and advocates came to demand truth as a right and argued that impunity itself is a crime.

This politics of apology was extended from countries that transitioned to democracy to countries involved in post conflict resolution and peace building. The politics manifested itself in the notion that impunity poses a risk of renewed conflict (whether dictatorship or war) and that redress is not only a right that should be implemented when feasible, but also a prudent policy, since it aims to avoid repetitions of the crimes in the future. "Never Again," and "No Justice No Peace" became frequent refrains. Fighting impunity has become common, and new institutions and new international norms have emerged, although the norms are often aspirational. The effectiveness of the norms and institutions remains debatable, though there is a correlation between redress and stronger democracy.**6** It is instructive, however, that studies of the impact of transitional justice mechanisms do not delineate between transitions to democracy and peace building; the studies assume that the same norms apply to both. This lack of differentiation should be noted precisely because the literature pays little attention to it and because the past is constructed and perceived very differently in these types of transitions. History is primarily grounded in group, national, and ethnic identity. In a homogenous democracy divided by political violence, the group remains the nation and the struggle over the narrative is domestic. When two groups, intrastate or international, quarrel over their history, the dispute remains alive in the descendant generations. The social life of the historical narrative is critical to its political potency. The growing attention to the past includes greater support for addressing long-standing disputes as well as group (minority) discrimination in democracies. When history is redressed in a democracy, the issues are usually several decades old (such as the reawakening of World War Two issues), but are sometimes much older (such as the demand for reparations for slavery, a very vocal demand in the 1990s). However, when history remains present in a conflict among groups (be they nations, ethnicities, or religions), conflict resolution often tries to overcome the history by focusing attention on the future rather than confronting the challenge of the past.

Conflict Resolution and Peace Building

The role of history in the international tensions in North East Asia is perhaps the strongest reminder to the conflict resolution community that "let bygones be bygones" in certain cases is the very antithesis of realpolitik. There are instances where history is at the heart of the conflict. As we move further away from the Cold War and its proxy wars, and as the identity of the protagonists has become more central to international conflicts, it is increasingly urgent that historical intervention be included in the conflict resolution paradigm. History is the narrative we tell of the past, sometimes as academics, but most often as nations. As such, the views of the protagonists of justice and historical injustices shape their willingness to engage and accept certain outcomes to conflicts and reject others. The notion that history is mere rhetoric that covers the "real" causes of contemporary disputes is, in certain cases, patently false. The dispute between Turkey and Armenia is not exclusively over the 1915 genocide, but all other aspects of the dispute are overshadowed by it.

Conflicts are varied and conflict resolution requires diverse approaches. I have no intention in these short paragraphs to capture the richness and diversity of these approaches. Despite the diversity of conflicts, however, they can be divided into either politically-motivated or identity-based conflicts, and each category includes both international and intrastate varieties. In conflicts whose core is political (such as Argentina), the historical ethos can be more easily resolved; the sides can even be reconciled. These cases privilege transitional justice mechanisms that emphasize the political processes of democratization and justice as a condition for reconciliation, and the historical disputes over the source of the conflict are secondary. Some combination of an apology, a truth commission and trials, possible reparations, and memorialization become part of the new identity of the nation. This permits participants to view the conflict as over, even if its legacy is etched in the new identity, and certain victims may emerge even decades later, as did the children of the disappeared in Argentina.

The situation is very different in identity-based conflicts, where the historical narrative continues to inform the two sides while the conflict resolution process takes place, and even after peace has been achieved. The conflicting truth can and does simmer in these cases, and disputes are prone to erupt for a whole host of reasons, including as a tool by nationalists to gain power. In these cases it is critical to address the historical ethos, narratives, and perspectives. Different disciplinary methodologies tend to emphasize different approaches. In addressing intractable conflicts, Daniel Bar-Tal for example emphasizes the importance of dealing with sociopsychological factors, which he describes as "collective memory, ethos of conflict, and collective emotional orientations" that shape the conflict: "The establishment of peaceful relations between the opposing parties depends on a successful reconciliation process, which in turn requires a change of the conflictive ethos and formation of the alternative *peace ethos*."**7** The psychological factors are no doubt critical, but how are those to be reshaped? Certain truisms are well accepted, such as that people form their "beliefs about conflict through selective information processing and biased interpretation of acquired information."

Those beliefs are polarized between societies in intractable conflicts. Conflict resolution experts recognize that reconciliation must include some or all of the following: truth, forgiveness, mercy, justice, peace, and looking to the future by creating new political, economic, social, and cultural relationships between the sides, groups, or states. In addition, there is a whole list of contextual factors, such as third party intervention, willingness in the society to engage in joint projects with the adversary, the strength of the parties that oppose reconciliation relative to those who support it, the involvement of educational, media and cultural/religious institutions that are on either side. All these are true and explain a great deal about why some processes are more successful than others. The psychological accommodation includes changing public beliefs about social goals and about the justness of those goals and the means used to achieve them, as well as about the adversary group. Yet, while psychologists and conflict resolution experts have engaged with the question of how to change these beliefs, they have paid too little attention to structural historical accommodation and reconciliation.

Global norms may frame how group beliefs operate, but it is the specific context and historical situation that shapes whether and which of these conflict resolution principles can be operationalized in a particular conflict. Because the specifics matter, historical rewriting is a key element in conflict resolution. Developing a new understanding of the conflict, which is the role of the historian, has been an underused resource in conflict resolution. We should recognize that

there is a critical role for historical dialogue in conflict resolution and peace building, and our goal ought to be to include historians as active participants in conflict resolution mechanisms and to build the institutional framework necessary to facilitate these engagements, including bi-lateral historical commissions that can construct bridging narratives that are disseminated widely. A more nuanced – and less nationalistic – view of history will be more likely to accommodate reconciliation. This certainly does not mean historical parity between perpetrations and victims, but it does mean demythologizing nationalist histories, engaging public opinion leaders so lies cannot be told with impunity, and treating adversaries with greater empathy. It is unlikely that there will ever be a single historical narrative; in fact, this is probably not even desirable. Nuances are important, and even a similar narrative carries distinct meanings for different protagonists. But a shared narrative allows adversaries to situate their differences in a single frame and perhaps craft a shared future.

Commemorations

The tension between the new morality and norms of transitional justice and nationalist histories and conflicts is manifested in history textbooks and memorials, two aspects of the identity of the nation that are often under intense reform during periods of transition. Not surprisingly, these arenas are subjects of conflict. How to remember heroes and victims? Who ought to be commemorated as perpetrator, as a bystander, as a victim? These become vexing issues in many conflict and post-conflict situations. In certain cases, memorialization of the evil is meant to declare that the country has changed. In Latin America, primarily in Argentina and Chile, this has been very clear. *Memoria Abierta* -- a coalition of human rights organizations dedicated to preserving and promoting the memory of violence during the period of State terrorism in Argentina (1976-1983) -- is a prominent example of numerous such commemorations, institutions, and projects in the region.**8** These organizations are committed primarily to strengthening democracy rather than engaging in conflict resolution, which is less relevant in the region. The two goals, however, share normative goals, where the success in one (democratization) increases the aspirations of the other. The struggle over memory in countries that are engaged in transition to democracy is complex, focusing on the specificity of what is to be remembered, the dates that ought to be commemorated, the forms and substance of the memories, and the identity of the nation. Yet, these disputes are relatively benign since the struggle is between a disappearing regime and the new government and civil society. It does not include a struggle between ethnic or religious groups that continue to uphold the defeated dictatorship ideology. In contrast, in post-conflict cases, the historical memory of each side is very distinct, and memory is most frequently employed to justify one side of the conflict and denigrate the other. There is a commitment to group identity that is rarely matched by political affinity and is not inherited in a similar manner. Second and third generations do not hold on to the ideology of the dictatorship, but they certainly maintain their ethnic and religious identity.

In certain cases, memorials provide a cleansing mechanism so that although the country remains under a version of an authoritarian regime, the commemorations of the previous atrocities aims to represent more of a transition than is actually merited. Perhaps the most visible examples are in Cambodia and Rwanda, where their respective genocides are the embodiment of national suffering and identity. In Cambodia the prime site of commemoration is Tuol Sleng, the

prison where the Khmer Rouge tortured and killed more than 17,000 prisoners. The site is kept in its original condition, and serves as a major tourist attraction. In 2002, a map of Cambodia made up of 300 human skulls on the wall in Tuol Sleng was removed, in order to soften Cambodia's image, to transform it from a "killing field" to a place for tourism and business. While Cambodia opens out to the world and aims to attract tourism, it remains authoritarian. Similarly, the Kigali Memorial Centre is at the heart of Rwanda's commemoration of the genocide and its web page vexes on the beauty of the country as much as on the horror. Yet each country remains under an authoritarian regime, where the government shows little tolerance towards the memory of victims of the current regime itself. This is particularly true in Rwanda, where Hutu victims and suffering are excluded from the official commemorations.**9** This type of historical manipulation bodes ill for the future, because repressed voices pose a risk to demand their due, which may lead to a new conflict.

Conflicting ethnic memories in shared sites lead to disputes during and following transition. The site becomes a focal point for the identity rivalry, channeling the conflict. A relatively benign example was manifested over the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. The monument commemorating Soviet soldiers in Estonia, originally named "Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn," was renamed in 2007 as "Monument to the Fallen in the Second World War" and relocated. The revised history dethroned the Soviets as liberators and replaced them with a provisional Estonian government that reputedly liberated Tallinn a few days before the Soviets arrived in September 1944. The 2007 rewriting of history was accompanied by the worst Estonian riots since its independence in 1991, with dozen injured and one dead. The monument, which attracts nationalists from both sides, became the focus of the dispute over the Soviet rule in Estonia.**10** Such sentiments were shared across Eastern Europe.

The projection of suffering on monuments often leads to aggravate conflict rather than foster reconciliation. This is especially true in cases where the conflict is ongoing, and where the commemoration becomes a tool of manipulation for nationalists. This is a particular challenge to the norm of validating victims, which implies validating their demands. The commemorations become the conflict. This is especially true in the former Yugoslavia, where the sites of crimes of atrocities dating back from WWII concentration camps to the massacres of 1990s provide unlimited political ammunition for the ethnic wars of memory. Srebrenica is the most horrific case from the 1990s wars, but other places abound. For example, in Vukovar memorialization proliferates and there is evidence that the "numerous war memorials are obstructing reconciliation between the town's Croats and Serbs" by encouraging selective memory, ignoring the Serb victims, and focusing attention on the past to the detriment of progress.**11** Very few people try to counter ethnic memorialization.**12**

Engaging the Past

The shared spaces of physical memory and identity instigate conflict, but they can also provide spaces for joint work and can promote conflict resolution. One such area is the content of history textbooks, which is often subject to intense conflict -- most famously in Japan during the 1990s. It is also an area where activists try to produce reformed texts that bridge nationalist narratives.**13** Museums, textbooks, historical commissions, and new media are just some of the areas where the identity struggle in post conflict societies takes place. While the transitional

justice community focuses on combatting impunity and validating memory of atrocities as an antidote to future crimes, the conflict resolution and peace building communities primarily direct their attention to the future. The debate between the two approaches is presented as a dispute between morality and realpolitik, where demands for justice interfere with achieving peace. This is particularly true these days in debates over indictments by the International Criminal Court in cases such as Sudan or Uganda, and was very hotly debated in the Balkans with the ICTY. It is also controversial in the cases of truth commissions, especially if these offer amnesty, since it is argued that amnesty encourages impunity. Whatever the relative merit of truth commissions versus trials (scope, expense, types of truth), each focuses the nation on acknowledging past crimes as way to shift the political culture of the state. In contrast, the conflict resolution community focuses on creating mechanisms that will facilitate agreements and establish institutions that will enable a new path by ignoring the past.

The two have to join forces. Conflict resolution has to incorporate history as a tool: it must engage in reforming the nationalist narrative so that it is no longer the nation's only legitimate narrative and available identity. Transitional justice has to recognize that validating victims' testimonies above all else is dangerous and that acknowledgement alone can foment conflict. Those engaged in international conflict resolution must recognize that history is *constructed*. There are many successful examples, many useful tools, and much work to be done. It is a challenge the international community has yet to recognize.

1 Gavan McCormack, "Abe Days Are Here Again: Japan in the World", *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 10(52), no. 1, December 24, 2012.

2 Wikipedia under "List of war apology statements issued by Japan" enumerate more than 50 instances of government officials who conveyed a variation of an apology over the years (2013).

3 Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

4 Lily Gardner Feldman, *Germany's Foreign Policy of Reconciliation: From Enmity to Amity*, Washington DC: Rowman & Littlefield, 2012. Berger, *ibid*.

5 Elazar Barkan, *The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices*, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.

6 Kathryn Sikkink, *The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics*, New York: W.W.Norton & Company, 2011. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, "Trials and Errors", *International Security*, Winter 2003/04, 28(3): 5-44. Tricia D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne, Andrew G. Reiter, *Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy*, US Institute of Peace Press, 2010.

7 Daniel Bar-Tal, "Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts", *American Behavioral Scientist*, July 2007, 50(11): 1430-1453, http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/50/11/1430; Daniel Bar-Tal, "From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis", *Political Psychology*, 2000, 21: 351-365.

8 http://www.memoriaabierta.org.ar/eng/index.php. Also, Elizabeth Jelin, "Public Memorialization in Perspective: Truth, Justice and Memory of Past Repression in the Southern Cone of South America," *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 2007, 1: 138-156.

9 René Lemarchand, "The Politics of Memory in Post-Genocide Rwanda" http://www.chgs.umn.edu/histories/occasional/Lemarchand_Memory_in_Rwanda.pdf Anna-Maria Brandstetter, "Contested Pasts: The Politics of Remembrance in Post-Genocide Rwanda," 2010. http://www.nias.knaw.nl/Content/NIAS/Publicaties/Ortelius/Ortelius_Lecture_6.pdf.

10 "Deadly Riots in Tallinn: Soviet Memorial Causes Rift between Estonia and Russia", http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/deadly-riots-in-tallinn-soviet-memorial-causes-rift-between-estonia-and-russia-a-479809.html.

11 Janine Natalya Clark, "Reconciliation through Remembrance? War Memorials and the Victims of Vukovar," *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 2013, 7: 116-135.

12 Elazar Barkan and Belma Becirbasic, "The Politics of Memory, Victimization and Activism in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina," ms.

13 Perhaps the most famous institute to consistently engage in writing history textbooks with the aim of promoting conflict resolution is the Georg Eckert Institute (http://www.gei.de/en/the-institute.html). An American organization "Facing History" (http://www.facing.org/), which is becoming increasingly global, uses history pedagogy in conflict resolution and anti-racist teaching. Also Elizabeth A. Cole (der.), *Teaching the Violent Past: History Education and Reconciliation*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007. There are many local and regional projects promoted by international organizations. See for example Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe (Thessaloniki); http://www.cdsee.org/ and the network of history teachers in Europe *Clio Europe* (http://www.euroclio.eu/new/).